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Abstract: That climate policies are costly is evident and therefore often create 
major fears. But the alternative (no action) also has a cost. Therefore, mitigation 
costs netted of the damage costs avoided are the only figure that can seriously be 
considered as the “genuine cost” of a policy. We elaborate on this view of a 
policy’s cost by distinguishing between its “direct” cost component and its 
avoided damage cost component; we then confront the two so as to evaluate its 
genuine cost. As damages avoided are equivalent to the benefits generated, this 
brings climate policies naturally in the realm of benefit-cost analysis. However, 
the sheer benefit-cost criterion may not be a sufficient incentive for a country to 
be induced to cooperate internationally, a necessary condition for an effective 
global climate policy. We therefore also explore how to make use of this criterion 
in the context of international climate cooperation.  
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1.  Introduction  
That climate policies are costly is evident and therefore often creates major 
fears in industry. Understandably so: actions of mitigation of GHG emissions 
require considerable resources hence entail high costs. Actors of industrial life 
consider this as a burden for our economies. Is it a bearable one? 
To appreciate that, consider the alternative, i.e. no action, and its cost: no 
action means our economies incurring damages, possibly considerable (see IPCC 
(2007), which will also be a burden. There are two categories of costs, one 
caused by climate change (damages incurred), the other caused by climate policy 
(mitigation costs) which in any sensible cost-benefit analysis of abatement 
policies have to be considered jointly. However, the amounts of each of the two 
terms in the sum vary depending upon what the policies are. In fact, they are 
substitutes: indeed, the more mitigation and adaptation actions, the less damages 
will be incurred, and the less of the former, the more of the latter. The reverse 
also holds: severe adverse climate impacts provide strong incentives for emission 
abatement. This naturally follows from realizing that policies aim at avoiding 
damages. In that perspective, avoiding damages appears to be the benefit that 
accompanies climate policies. And if that benefit appears to be larger than the 
mitigation and adaptation cost (the “direct” cost, for short), such policies can be 
deemed economically sound. Actually, costs and benefits are the two sides of a 
same coin. 
This reasoning brings climate policies naturally in the realm of benefit-cost 
analysis, a well-established instrument of decision-making in the public sector. In 
this paper, we wish first to simply illustrate the “direct” cost component of 
various policies (Section 2), then to confront them with the benefits generated, 
that is, the damage cost avoided (Section 3) and draw (in Section 4) preliminary 
conclusions on the policies’ respective justification. The purpose here is mostly 
to offer the reader information on the orders of magnitude as provided by 
published advanced models, thereby avoiding to enter into the details of these. 
 In climate affairs, there is however an additional dimension to the benefit 
side just identified. In the way it is invoked above, the benefit-cost criterion 
makes no reference to the multi-national component of the issue. When the 
problem that requires action is of exclusively national nature, benefits as well as 
costs are those that accrue to the country and these only determine the decision. 
Transposing benefit-cost analysis to enlighten decision-making on issues with 
international impacts cannot simply consist in an addition of national benefits and 
costs of domestically chosen strategies. In a multi-national context, there is often 
– and certainly in the climate change case – a superadditive aspect to the possible 
joint actions by the countries, in the sense that together they can (i) do more that 
the sum of their alternative individualistic policies, and (ii) generate a larger joint 
benefit than the sum of their benefits when acting individualistically. 
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 Therefore, the sheer domestic benefit-cost criterion is not a sufficient 
incentive to induce the synergies needed to achieve efficiency at the world level. 
Additional and specific motivations of some sort for adopting non-individualistic 
policies are called for. What can they consist of? In Section 5 we advocate for 
and illustrate the role of inter-country transfers to go beyond the standard 
framework of selfish national benefit-cost analysis to implement an efficient 
international climate agreement.  
2.  What is the cost of a climate policy? 
2.1  The policy’s direct cost as a burden for the economy 
 A comprehensive and interesting synthesis of the direct cost approach is 
provided in the survey by Edenhofer et. al. (2010). This survey covers four major 
numerical simulation models that are widely used in policy discussions, namely: 
MERGE (Kypreos and Bahn, 2003), REMIND-R (Leimbach et al., 2010), 
POLES-ETSAP (European Commission, 1996) and TIMER (Bouwman et al. 
2006). All models project how the economy may evolve spontaneously in the 
future (about a century), and then examine how a couple of discretionary climate 
policies affect the estimated evolution of the GDPs, both national and at the 
world level. The policies considered are expressed in terms of global caps either 
on emission levels, or on carbon concentration in the atmosphere, or still on 
average temperature increase. These caps are introduced as exogenous constraints 
in the models, which for the rest are optimal growth models.  
 As to how the burden is measured, in the MERGE and REMIND models 
the cost is measured as discounted cumulative GDP losses up to 2100 relative to 
some baseline, and it is expressed in percent of the baseline GDP over the same 
period. The POLES and TIMER models report instead the increase in abatement 
costs relative to the baseline, also expressed in percent of GDP. For all models 
the discount rate is 3 percent a year and net present values are calculated with 
2000 as the base year. The results are reported in figure 7 in Edenhofer et. al. 
(2010, page 31).  
 Edenhofer et al. (2010) focus on three policies. All of them are expressed 
in terms of alternative caps on global GHG concentration in 2100, respectively of 
400, 450 and 550 ppm CO2-eq. Two key conclusions emerge from this model 
comparison. First, the direct costs of the policies considered are small: the 550 
ppm cap entails a 0.8% cumulated loss of world GDP in 2100, the 400 ppm cap a 
2.5% loss. Second, despite differences in the orders of magnitude, all models 
agree on the qualitative message that policy costs are limited.3 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  It can be noticed that, in this model comparison, the choice of the policy instruments that would be able to implement the policy within and 
among the countries is not discussed. This boils down to assume that these instruments are cost-effective, like a global carbon tax. In other 
words, the global effectiveness of the scenarios is analyzed disregarding the issue of their national implementation. See Bosetti and Victor 
(2011) for a discussion on that point.  
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2.2  The policy’s genuine cost  
 In case of “no policy”, what is the burden? Is there at all a cost for the 
economy? What we have described above as “direct” costs are absent, since no 
action entailing them – mitigation or adaptation – is taken in that case. 
Unfortunately, this is only one side of the coin, as other costs are involved. 
Indeed, global warming has powerful physical impacts on earth such as storms, 
coastal erosion, sea level rise and droughts. These in turn entail damages that are 
materialized in losses of economic goods, properties and assets, let alone human 
lives. These damages are sheer destructions of parts of the economy, and they are 
maximal in case of no action. Clearly there is a cost of doing nothing. 
 But policies, if rational, aim at reducing damages. Therefore, the genuine 
cost to society of any climate policy is to be thought of as a number which is net 
of the damage costs the policy allows one to avoid — in other words, it is the 
number obtained by subtracting the value of the avoided damages from the 
burden of the direct cost described above. If negative, this genuine cost is 
obviously a net benefit, implying that the policy is justified according to the 
standards of benefit-cost analysis.  
 It is important to note at this point that for any country the benefits as well 
as the costs are not to be considered in isolation: their magnitude also depends on 
the policies implemented abroad, be they the result of international agreements or 
not. This extension of the reasoning will be the topic of Section 5.  
3.  Evaluating two policies in terms of their genuine cost 
The most striking example of a statement on climate change made recently 
in the spirit of benefit-cost analysis is the Stern Review (Stern, 2007). Using an 
integrated assessment model (henceforth IAM) of the world economy, namely 
the PAGE model, the Review estimates that, for the policies it defines, benefits in 
terms of value of damages avoided would range between 5 and 20 percent of 
world GDP every year and for ever, whereas mitigation costs to achieve this 
damage avoidance would amount to about 1 to 2 % of world GDP, every year 
and for ever.  We propose to apply the same reasoning to two among the policy 
choices studied in Edenhofer et al. (2010), namely the 650 and 550 ppm caps, 
and check whether or not they pass the benefit-cost criterion. We do this by using 
our own IAM, namely CWS (for CLIMNEG World Simulation)4, so as to see 
whether a result such as Stern’s can be obtained by means of this alternative 
measurement tool.5 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  A full description of the CWS model (including parameter values)  can be found in Bréchet et al. (2011) for the 6-region version, and in 
Bréchet et al. (2012) for the 18-region version (which is, by the way, also stochastic). 
5 See Kolstad and Toman (2005) for an introduction and overview of integrated assessment climate-economy models, Bréchet and Luterbacher 
(2014) for a discussion on their usefulness for policy support and Bréchet and Eyckmans (2012) on how they support some political economy 
concepts to manage the global commons.  
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The CWS model is to close the original RICE model by Nordhaus and 
Yang (1996) or its variations as in Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003), Yang (2008) 
and Bréchet et al. (2012). In the model, the world is split into 18 regions or 
countries. An essential characteristic of an IAM is the endogenous feedback 
between the economy and the climate. Decision variables are capital 
accumulation (to sustain economic growth) and GHGs emission abatement (to 
control climate change). CWS can also be seen as a general equilibrium model in 
the sense that all the dimensions of the economy are endogenous, in particular 
capital accumulation. The model consists of an optimal control problem in which 
investment in physical capital and abatement efforts are the control variables and 
temperature change is the state variable. The objective function to be maximized 
is the intertemporal welfare expressed as the discounted green consumption (Z), 
i.e. gross output (Y, driven by capital accumulation and population growth) net of 
investment in capital (I), emission abatement costs (C) and climate damages (D, 
driven by GHGs concentration and temperature change), so that we have Z = Y – 
I – C – D for all countries and at all time periods. The alternative policies to be 
examined below are introduced, as mentioned above, as alternative constraints on 
the GHG concentration that results from the emissions generated by the gross 
output. 
From the model’s solution we compute as follows, in terms of the 
distinction made in Section 2, the aggregate cost of any policy, say “policy P”.  
The direct cost is denoted CP ; the damage cost it allows to avoid is (DBAU – DP), 
where DBAU is the damage cost that would occur under the “business as usual” 
(i.e. no policy) benchmark scenario (to be defined shortly), and DP is the damage 
cost that remains incurred under the policy P. This yields the genuine cost of 
policy P  (GCP) as 
 GCP = CP –(DBAU – DP). (1) 
3.1  The genuine cost of the cap-650 ppm and cap-550 ppm policies 
Let us consider the following two global policies: 
• “cap-650 ppm”: a policy of global emissions abatement which ensures optimal 
growth of the economy by (i) maximizing present and future green 
consumption, that is, net of both the abatement and damage costs entailed by 
the policy, and (ii) constraining abatements to the condition that the 
concentrations they entail in the atmosphere never exceed 650 ppm CO2-eq 
over the period 2000-2100. 
• “cap-550 ppm”: a similar policy with the only difference that the global 
concentration is constrained never to exceed the tighter bound of 550 ppm 
CO2-eq.6 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 With the 400 ppm cap constraint, the CWS model has no feasible solution, as it is the case with many other models mentioned in Edenhofer 
et al. 2010. Thus, for most climate-economy models reviewed here, this cap cannot be reached. A view shared by many climatologists, 
actually. This is the reason why we consider only 550 and 650 ppm caps in this paper. 
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We wish to compare these two policies with two benchmark scenarios that are 
common in the literature: 
• “BAU”: Business as usual, which means no discretionary abatement policy 
and thus no abatement costs; damage costs are as they result from the laissez 
faire emissions that accompany the natural growth of the economy and no 
constraint applies to CO2 concentration.  
• “COOP”: Optimal abatement policy at the world level, i.e. the one that 
maximizes present and future green consumption without binding constraint 
on CO2 concentration. 
In other words, the “BAU” scenario is the pure case of “no action” in the 
framework of a world market economy, whereas “COOP” describes the best 
global outcome that can be achieved, according to the CWS model, in combining 
economic growth and environmental protection, with no institutional framework 
being specified for its achievement and no redistributive effects among countries 
being taken into account either.  
To sum up, we thus consider two policies and two scenarios in this section. 
The first two (henceforth “cap-650” and “cap-550”) are well-defined programs of 
global action (i.e. action at the world level), whereas the other two (“BAU” and 
“COOP”) are only benchmarks provided for the sake of comparison. The former 
describes an environmentally “worst” case in a growth context, and the latter an 
environmentally “best” case compatible with growth.  
Figure 1 displays the time profiles of GHGs emissions implied by these two 
policies and the two benchmark-scenarios. Thus for example, optimal economic 
growth under the “cap-550” policy implies to let global emissions increase up to 
9.7 GtC per year in 2060 and then to let them decrease down to 5.0 GtC per year 
in 2100. As for the “cap-650” policy, the maximum yearly emissions are higher 
(14.1 GtC) and are reached only later, in 2080.  
It is interesting to see that these two policies generate emission levels far 
below those of the worst case: thus, the cap-550 policy requires in 2100 global 
emissions to be reduced by 76 percent with respect to those of the “BAU” 
scenario.  This policy also succeeds in bringing emissions back to their level of 
the year 2000. It is also interesting to notice that in both policies emissions are 
below those of the “best” scenario, as calculated by the CWS model. Note in 
particular that emissions under the cap-650 policy are close to those of the COOP 
scenario for a major part of the time period covered. 
< Please insert Fig. 1 around here > 
 Let us now consider the respective genuine costs of these policies and 
scenarios, as described by Equation (1). 
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 As far as the direct costs CP components are concerned, we do the analysis 
with the same kind of calculations and graphs as used by Edenhofer et al. (2010). 
Thus, we calculate CP as the cumulated yearly losses in world GDP up to 2100, 
discounted at a 2-percent yearly discount rate. These costs appear on Figure 2 
where one can see that for the two policies the direct costs are, respectively, a 1.1 
percent loss in cumulated GDP for the “cap-550” policy, and a 0.4 percent loss 
for the “cap-650” policy. These cost numbers are of an order of magnitude 
similar to those provided by Edenhofer et al. (2010) and reported above. Climate 
damage costs avoided with respect to the BAU scenario (DBAU – DP) in either 
policy are presented in the same way on Figure 2. The cumulated such avoided 
costs are respectively of 0.4 percent of world GDP for the 550 ppm policy and 
0.3 percent for the 650 ppm policy.  
Finally, the genuine costs of the two policies appear as the right bars of 
Figure 2. Being positive, these bars reveal that the cumulated damage costs 
avoided by these policies do not outweigh the cumulated direct costs. But when 
these are netted out of the damage costs avoided, their genuine costs become 
respectively only 0.6 percent and even 0.1 percent of world GDP. Obviously, 
when the presentation of the policies’ cost is restricted to the direct costs only 
(1.1% and 0.4% of GDP respectively as just mentioned), the picture is 
overestimated.  And the overestimation is of 67% for cap-550 and 258% for cap-
650 when the comparison is made with the genuine cost. We feel that this 
overestimation is so large that it cannot be ignored in the political debate.  
< Please insert Fig. 2 around here > 
 To further evaluate these policies, we now turn to the other benchmark, 
namely the “COOP” scenario, as computed with the CWS model. By definition 
this scenario is optimal, i.e. it maximizes world welfare, measured by the green 
GDP denoted above as Z and it specifies no cap a priori: the optimal path of CO2 
concentration in this scenario is simply the one determined by the emissions 
labeled COOP on the Figure 1. Here we obtain that the damage costs avoided 
outweigh the direct costs as shown by the three bars in the right part of Figure 2. 
The genuine cost of this optimal scenario is thus negative which   implies that a 
policy that would implement this scenario is profitable at the world level.  
 Compared with COOP, the fact that the two policies with the constraints of 
550 ppm and 650 ppm, respectively, have a higher genuine cost shows that these 
constraints are too stringent: these policies overshoot. Because of their excessive 
stringency, both policies are even worse than the business-as-usual scenario. Of 
course, this holds given the considered numerical parameters in our model. The 
bars in the left and middle parts of the Figure further suggest that this 
overshooting is entirely due to the higher abatement cost, since under either one 
of them, the sum total of the damages avoided is higher that in the COOP 
scenario. 
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It must be emphasized that very large uncertainties prevail in the economic 
evaluation of climate damages, on the choice of the functional form of the 
damage functions used in integrated assessment models (such as CWS), and on 
the calibration of these functions. Even if uncertainties affect all aspects of the 
costs entailed by climate change, criticisms often concentrate on the fact that 
damage costs are very crudely estimated, which we acknowledge. This field does 
require continuing research efforts.  Proposing an alternative calibration for the 
damage functions to make these estimates more reliable in IAMs is not within the 
scope of this paper.7 But checking the robustness of our results against such 
uncertainties surely deserves attention. It can be done by carrying out a 
sensitivity analysis on the parameters of these functions so as to have an idea of 
how they impact the results. 
3.2  A sensitivity analysis 
 Given our concern with the avoided damage costs we provide here a 
sensitivity analysis bearing on the damage cost function used in the CWS model. 
This increasing function is of the exponential form, with the exponent assumed to 
be 2.0 in all countries in the previous calculations. In this section we change this 
parameter to 2.7, making the common damage function much steeper.  
 The computational results are first displayed in Figure 3 for world GHG 
emissions. By definition, the emission profile is strictly the same for the “BAU” 
scenario. But two very interesting and innovative results come out from this 
figure.  
 The first one is about the time profile of GHG emissions in the cap-550 
and cap-650 scenarios, which differ from Fig. 1. Remember that the constraints 
are to not outreach the stated cap on GHG concentration. The model thus 
determines the optimal growth i.e. the one that maximizes intertemporal green 
consumption if the economy operates under these constraints. Because climate 
damages are now evaluated to be heavier, their impact on welfare is also 
stronger, which pushes the countries to devote more resources to abatement of 
emissions. This is illustrated in Fig. 3 for the cap-550 policy case: the maximum 
emission level is now 9.0 GtC, while it was 10.0 GtC previously (both reached in 
2070). Eventually this increase in abatement translates into a smaller green 
consumption level (not shown on the Figure).  
 The second appealing result is that the “cap-650” policy now coincides 
with the “COOP” scenario over the whole simulation period. Thus, this policy 
brings the world on a green consumption path virtually identical to the one that 
maximizes world welfare (under our parameter values). This reveals that the 
world optimal solution (“COOP”) is far from being completely unrealistic from a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Climate sensitivity is also one of the key uncertainties. In a stochastic version of the CWS model with risk aversion, by taking this 
uncertainty into account we show that cooperation among countries actually brings a double benefit : it increases global welfare, and also 
sharply reduces the risk of high climate damages. See Bréchet et al. (2012).   
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policy standpoint and should not be considered as purely theoretical. Sometimes 
the best can be achieved. In other words, and in the reverse perspective, 
prescriptive policies discussed today in the political area (here, “cap-650”) may 
meet the normative analysis (here, “COOP”). Although environmentally more 
stringent, and therefore perhaps politically more attractive to some, the “cap-550” 
policy is not better welfarewise because it restricts green consumption too much: 
it is actually too stringent.  
Let us now turn back to the genuine costs and their components by using 
the same presentation as in Section 3.1. The fact that the countries are more 
sensitive to temperature increases translates into our two given policies entailing 
larger abatement efforts than before (for the “cap-550”policy: 1.2% against 1.1% 
previously; for “cap-650”: 0.9% against 0.4% previously) as well as larger 
damage costs avoided. This appears from comparing Fig. 4 with Fig. 2. 
What is the new balance between direct costs and damage costs avoided? 
Fig. 4 shows that the “cap-550” policy entails higher direct costs than damage 
costs avoided, this resulting for the genuine cost in a 0.05% net GDP cumulated 
loss over the century. The policy is thus not socially profitable. By contrast, the 
balance is positive for the “cap-650” policy (expressed by a negative genuine cost 
of 0.17%). The “cap-650” policy thus passes the benefit-cost criterion, just like 
the scenario it is identical to. 
< Please insert Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 around here > 
The question of whether our results are sensitive to the choice of the 
discount rate cannot be avoided. In the paper we consider a low discount rate (2 
percent per year). Choosing a higher discount rate would unambiguously yield 
the following outcome: (i) both cumulated discounted direct costs and damage 
costs avoided would be lower; (ii) however, the balance between the two 
categories would move in favour of the direct costs, because these costs are borne 
in the short term while avoided damage costs only occurs in the long run; (iii) as 
a result, the genuine costs of the two policies (550 and 650 ppm) would increase, 
this corresponding to a lowering of the benefit/cost ratio.  
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4.  Regional acceptability: a necessary condition for reaching an 
international agreement  
 Regional/national acceptability relies on a regional/national cost benefit 
analysis.  Even though climate change is a global public bad, costs and benefits 
are local because both are experienced at the regional/national scale. Highlighting 
regional costs and benefits for a given policy is thus key to understand national 
political standpoints in the international negotiations process. Even though many 
papers in the literature pay attention to the spatial differentiation of costs and 
benefits of climate policies (see, e.g. Bosetti et al. (2013), Cantore (2011), 
Kemfert (2004), Lessman and Edenhofer (2011) or Nagashima et al. (2009)), 
none of them explicitly use our genuine cost concept to characterize countries’ 
negotiation position.  
The previous analysis confirms that the genuine costs of the two policies 
discussed are, after all, quite small. They can even be negative, that is, they may 
have positive impacts: if the modeling is correct, the “cap-650” policy is not 
costly but beneficial to the world as a whole. Then, why is it so hard for the world 
to agree on such a policy? A major obstacle lies in the fact that the respective 
levels of direct costs and of avoided damage costs differ widely among countries. 
Indeed, a global policy, which is good for all when considered as an aggregate, 
may not be good for everyone, considered individually. We illustrate that with 
numbers provided by the CWS model for the “cap-650” policy. Fig. 5 shows 
avoided damage costs and direct costs geographically broken down as they occur 
in the 18 regions distinguished in the CWS model. Direct costs are displayed on 
the vertical axis, avoided damage costs on the horizontal one. Both are expressed 
as previously in percent of regional cumulated GDP until 2100.  
< Please insert Fig. 5 around here > 
< Please insert Table 1 not too far from Fig. 5 > 
 With this diagram the acceptability of a policy by each country can be 
characterized in three ways.  
 First, in terms of the respective importance of the domestic avoided damage 
costs and the direct costs each country incurs under the policy: if a country is 
located above the 45° line it experiences avoided damage costs larger than direct 
costs, which shows the policy to be domestically profitable. The country is likely 
to support that policy. By contrast, for a country located below the 45° line the 
policy is not domestically profitable, which makes the country likely to be 
against it. In either case, the larger the distance to the 45° line, the stronger the 
incentive to support or to reject the policy. The diagram thus shows distinct 
winners and losers.   
	   	   	  
	   11	  
 Second, while a policy entailing avoided damage costs equal to direct costs 
for all countries would put them all on the 45° line, a globally beneficial policy 
with avoided damage costs larger than direct costs for all countries would put 
them all above the 45° line. By the same token, for any globally beneficial policy 
but not so for all of them, the points in the diagram would be scattered in such a 
way that the set of countries lying above the line enjoy profitability for a total 
amount larger than the total amount of losses incurred by those lying below.  
 Third, the radial distance of any point to the origin can be seen as an overall 
measure of how much is at stake macroeconomically for a country adopting the 
climate policy under consideration. Indeed, that distance expresses, in percentage 
points of the country’s gross domestic product, the two cost components that we 
deal with in this paper, namely the direct cost on the abscissa and the avoided 
damage cost on the ordinate. For countries whose point is located close to the 
origin, both avoided damage costs and direct costs are only a minor proportion of 
their GDP, so that not much is at stake with the policy under consideration and 
the risk of wasting resources by erroneously supporting it is therefore not high. 
Things are different for countries located far from the origin: direct costs and/or 
avoided damage costs in that case are a large proportion of their GDP, and the 
consequences of making mistakes in the estimation of the policy’s components, 
or in its implementation, constitute a much larger risk.  
 In view of the important uncertainties attached to the empirical assessments 
of the direct costs and avoided damage costs of climate change, be they large or 
small, one may invoke risk aversion to explain that the more a country is located 
away from the origin on this chart, the more likely it is to be reluctant to adopt 
the policy.  
 Finally, Fig. 5 suggests a classification of countries in three clusters:  
• Cluster 1, composed of developed countries (e.g. USA, EU, JPN, CAN, 
OEU...): with moderate avoided damage costs as well as moderate direct 
costs, they have positive but weak incentives to support the “cap-650” policy, 
or weak opposition; 
• Cluster 2, composed of less-developed countries (AFR, Mediterraneans, 
RAS...): they bear high direct abatement costs but also high avoided damage 
costs: so they should have strong positive incentives for supporting the “cap-
650” policy; 
• Cluster 3, composed of intermediate emerging countries (CHN, Middle East 
Asia, IND): they face high direct abatement costs but limited avoided damage 
costs, so they are likely to be strongly against (for CHN and MEA) or 
indifferent (IND) towards the “cap-650” policy; these three countries are also 
those for whom the “cap 650” policy entails the highest macroeconomic 
challenge (as measured in the Figure by their large radial distance away from 
the origin).  
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Fig. 5 shows that the “cap 650” policy would make some countries better 
off and some others worse off w.r.t. business-as-usual. Under such 
circumstances, can it at all be implemented, knowing that it requires a fully 
cooperative collective abatement effort among the countries? Answering this 
question raises two issues: (i) what is the burden sharing scheme implicit in the 
policy?, (ii) how are the net benefits shared in that policy? 
As to burden sharing, the total abatement cost implied by the policy is 
supposed to be shared across countries in such a way that it be minimized, a 
feature of the model which simply applies the condition of equalization of the 
countries’ marginal abatement costs. Thus, cost effectiveness at the world level is 
ensured. 
As to the sharing of the net benefits, however, cost effectiveness does not 
ensure political acceptability, i.e. the fact that every country be willing to support 
the policy. Indeed, it is revealed by the Figure that for many countries/regions, 
the benefit they derive from it is lower than the cost they have to bear: on that 
basis, they would simply not support it. This is particularly true for China and 
Middle East Asia.  
But the overall situation depicted by the Figure also suggests that they 
might nevertheless be induced to support such a policy if transfers of some kind 
(financial or economic resources) were envisaged from the winners to the losers, 
so as to bring the latter on, or above the 45° line. On Fig. 5, a transfer is 
visualized by a horizontal shift of the point that represents the country: to the left 
if the country receives the transfer, and to the right if the country contributes to 
the transfer.8 Clearly, an acceptability condition of the transfer scheme is that it 
keeps the winners above the line too. This is in fact possible, but only if the 
policy under consideration generates a positive global amount of net benefits, i.e. 
a negative global genuine cost.  
We reported above that with higher parameter values in the damage 
functions (2.7 instead of 2.0), the CWS model shows that the “cap 650” policy 
does generate such a positive global surplus (see Fig. 3). In this case, though, 
redrawing Fig. 5 shows that two countries would still not support the policy 
(namely, China and India). But since the global benefit of the policy is positive, 
the benefits of the countries located above the 45° line are sufficient to 
compensate these two countries for their losses, and bring them on the 45° line. 
This would make the “cap 650” policy compatible with individual rationality, to 
be understood here as the property that every country has an interest in the global 
policy and no one wishes to turn back to business-as-usual. This shows how 
national interests and the global policy are interlinked. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Because the x-axis represents relative regional GDP losses or gains, the Euclidean distance does not display the absolute amount of transfers. 
So, the distances cannot be compared among countries.  
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In a recently developed literature on so-called “climate coalitions” this 
discussion of the individual incentives for countries to participate in international 
agreements with transfers is currently generalized to groupings of countries. Cost 
and benefits criteria as well as inter-country transfers are called upon, like here, 
to address the following more general question: can a coalition of countries, 
through an agreement among its members, be stable and effective when each 
country takes into account only its own costs and benefits? The present paper is a 
natural introduction to that literature.9 
5.  Summary and conclusion 
 The message of this paper is a simple one. That preventive actions against 
the effects of climate change are costly is widely argued; that the thereby avoided 
damage costs are even more considerable is less advertised. Yet, these are two 
equally inescapable components of the problem. While the huge complexity of 
both the physical and the economic aspects of the problem justifies the recourse 
to highly sophisticated modeling techniques, benefit-cost analysis is also 
necessary to provide justification of action, because it is a simple and basic tool 
of economic reasoning, as well as a powerful instrument to convince the public at 
large. 
 In this paper, we propose to evaluate climate policies by combining the 
two approaches of modeling and benefit-cost analysis. That combination is 
possible if the economic modeling is complete, that is, if it covers what we have 
called the genuine cost of policies and not only their direct costs. We conclude in 
terms that are precise enough for decision taking, excluding some policies (e.g. 
the one aiming at the concentration objective of 550 ppm), and supporting other 
ones (e.g. 650 ppm). For sure, the model we use is a stylized one and its 
parameter values are quite uncertain. Yet the gist of our conclusion is less in the 
absolute numbers themselves than in the virtues of the two-fold methodology that 
allowed to formulate them. 
  In that spirit we have replicated with our own model the previous and path 
breaking approach of Stern (2007). Contrary to what some might call a repetition, 
such replication is an essential component of modeling methodology, as is well 
known in physical sciences. Given the utmost economic importance of the policy 
decisions to be made, it would be foolish to satisfy ourselves with just one 
estimate. Only repeated studies, if reasonably converging in their conclusions, 
can provide a credible basis for action on climate change. 
 By breaking it down in its multi-country or regional dimensions, our 
benefit-cost analysis further points out, by means of a simple diagram, what is 
probably the hardest obstacle to international cooperation in climate affairs, 
namely the economic fact that avoided damage costs and direct costs differ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See Bréchet et al. (2011) for an expository presentation of the stability and effectiveness concepts, with numerical illustrations, and an 
extended list of relevant references. 
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widely across countries, and across policies. For some countries, avoided damage 
costs do not reach the level of the direct costs they will endure even under an 
optimal policy: hence they resist joining international agreements that would 
require them to curb their emissions. In other countries, the avoided damage costs 
do outweigh the direct costs of mitigation. Thus, there is room for the latter to 
compensate the former in some way. But payment of such compensations also 
triggers resistance. While an economic analysis like the one above does show that 
such a scheme is feasible, its implementation requires in addition considerable 
diplomatic skills to overcome the said resistances, as experienced by the long and 
patient negotiation process of the UNFCCC. 
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Table 1. Countries/regions in the CWS model 
AFR Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape 
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Congo Dem. 
Republic, Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, 
Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambian Zimbabwe  
AUZ Australia, New Zealand 
CAN Canada 
CEA Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,  
CHN China, Hong-Kong 
EAS Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam 
EU Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
United Kingdom 
FSU Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan 
IND India 
JPN Japan, Korea (South) 
LAM Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela 
LAO Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago 
MEA Bahrain, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates, Yemen 
MED Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey 
OEU Iceland, Norway, Switzerland 
RAS Bangladesh, Cambodia, Laos, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New 
Guinea, Sri Lanka 
RO
W 
Albania, Barbados, Bhutan Brunei, Croatia, Fiji, Korea (North), 
Macedonia (FYR), Maldives, Myanmar, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent & 
Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome & Principe, Serbia & Montenegro, 
Solomon Islands, Tonga, Vanuatu  
USA United States of America 
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Figure 1. World GHG emissions in the two policies and two scenarios 
 
 
Figure 2. Direct costs, damage costs avoided, and genuine costs  
of the “cap-550”, “cap-650” policies and of the “COOP” scenario. 
Measured in % of world GDP, cumulated over the period 2000-2100, by 
means of the CWS model  
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Figure 3. World GHGs emissions with steeper damage functions in the two 
policies and two scenarios (remarkable: the optimal 650 ppm trajectory 
and COOP almost coincide in this case) 
 
 
Figure 4. Sensitivity analysis for direct costs, avoided damage costs and genuine 
costs 
for “cap-550”, “cap-650” policies and “COOP” scenario,  
with steeper damages functions 
 
 
 
	   	   	  
	   20	  
Figure 5. Costs (i.e. direct costs) versus benefits (i.e. avoided damages) at the 
regional level for the “cap-650” policy (for country codes, please refer to Table 
1)  
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